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Chapter 26 0 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
2015 Annual Report'
In 2015, noteworthy decisions at the intersection of constitutional law and
environmental, energy, and natural resources law occurred in the areas of standing, the
Commerce Clause, preemption, takings, due process, the First Amendment, the Eleventh
Amendment, and state constitutional law.
I. STANDING
To invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III court, a plaintiff must establish
standing by proving: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, not
hypothetical or conjectural; (2) causation that is fairly traceable to the defendant's
actions; and (3) redressability showing that a judicial remedy is likely to fix the injury
caused by the defendant. A plaintiff also has to meet the requirements of prudential
standing, including the requirement that the plaintiff's alleged injury falls within the zone
of interest of the relevant statute.
During 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two standing decisions that,
although not specifically in environmental cases, speak to important issues of legislative
standing and association standing. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indezpendent
Redistricting Commission, the Supreme Court heard the state legislature's challenge to a
citizen ballot initiative that gave redistricting power to an independent commission,
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC), in an effort to end
gerrymandering in the state. After AIRC created the 2012 redistricting map, the
legislature sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction, claiming the power given to
the commission ran afoul of the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
arguably gives sole authority to the state legislature. A three-judge panel of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona ruled the legislature had standing to sue but
rejected the suit on its merits. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the district court ruling,
finding that the legislature had standing but rejecting on the merits, noting that "one must
not 'confus[e] weakness on the merits with the absence of Article III standing.",2 Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, said that the constitutional amendment giving sole
authority to the AIRC completely nullifies any vote the legislature might take to affect
redistricting plans. The nullification of votes the legislature could previously take was
sufficient to establish an injury in fact.
In Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, voters in Alabama challenged
the redistricting plans for the state's house and senate, claiming at least four counties
1Contributing authors were: Sidney F. Ansbacher, Upchurch, Bailey and Upchurch P.A.;
Alexander J. Bandza, Jenner & Block LLP; Joseph Baskin, Golden Gate University
School of Law, Class of 2016; Norman A. Dupont, Richards Watson Gershon; Gary S.
Edinger, Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A.; Priscilla Norwood Harris,
Associate Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law; Helen Kang, Professor of Law
and Director of the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University
School of Law; Trish McCubbin, Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School
of Law; and Taylor Sprehe, Southern Illinois University School of Law, Class of 2016.
We thank Kyle H. Landis-Marinello, Vermont Office of Attorney General, for research
assistance. This report was edited by Trish McCubbin, Professor of Law, Southern
Illinois University School of Law.
2Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015)
(quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011)).
were gerrymandered along racial boundaries, violating the Equal Protection Clause. The
district court ruled, among other issues, that one of the plaintiffs, the Alabama
Democratic Conference (Conference), lacked associational standing because the record
did "not clearly identify the districts in which the individual members of the [Conference]
reside."3 For an association to have standing, the association must show that one of its
members has the standing to sue in his or her own right, which means in this case the
member would have to live in the district where the alleged gerrymandering took place.
The district court raised the standing issue sua sponte and found it insufficient that the
Conference merely stated in testimony that it has members in almost every county in the
state. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record was sufficient to support at
least a request that the Conference submit further evidence showing it has members in the
counties at issue rather than dismissing the claim entirely.
The Courts of Appeals also gave us notable standing decisions. In Organized
Village of Kake v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Ninth Circuit en banc addressed
intervenor standing.4 The Village of Kake brought suit against the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) over whether the federal agency properly exempted the Tongass
National Forest from the Roadless Rule, which requires certain areas of land to limit
construction and tree harvesting. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska
granted summary judgment for the Village, holding the exemption violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the USDA failed to provide adequate
reasoning for the exemption. The State of Alaska appealed as an intervenor. While
intervenors are able to seek review, their test for injury in fact is whether their interests
"have been adversely affected by the judgment."5 The Ninth Circuit held that Alaska
would be adversely affected by the judgment because under the National Forest Receipts
program, Alaska is entitled to 25% of gross timber sales from the state's national forests,
which will be affected by the Roadless Rule and the Tongass Exemption. A petition for
certiorari is pending at the Supreme Court as of December 2015, but it does not raise the
standing issue; rather, it asks the Court to consider the circumstances under which a
federal agency may alter its policy position-here, in the never-ending battle about the
Roadless Rule.
In Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit addressed the zone of
interests test.6 An environmental organization (Gunpowder) challenged a certificate
issued to Columbia Gas Transmission by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) for the extension of a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The appeals court found
that Gunpowder had organizational standing but concluded the threat of eminent domain,
embodied in the proposed pipeline extension, did not fall within the zone of interest
protected by the statutes under which they sued.
Other appellate court standing cases from this year include:
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dept. oL I riculture, in which the Ninth Circuit
ruled an environmental organization had standing to sue USDA for using archaic
and unnecessarily destructive predator control methods, rather than using updated
methods and systems. 7 Mere speculation that the state could implement its own
3Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (2015).
4795 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (pending on the merits, not
the standing issue).5Id. at 963 (quoting Didrickson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992)).
6807 F.3d 267 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
7795 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2015).
equally destructive methods in the absence of the federal government doing so did
not defeat redressability.
Cottonwood Environmental Law Center v. U.S. Forest Service, in which the Ninth
Circuit ruled an environmental organization had standing to sue the Forest Service
when it declined to reinitiate consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
after a critical habitat designation was revised for the Canadian Lynx. 8 Because
the organization alleged a "procedural injury," it did not have to demonstrate that
additional consultation would change the ultimate outcome of the government's
deliberations.
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall have the Power... [t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States." 9 In its
positive form, the Commerce Clause is the source of constitutional authority underlying
most federal environmental laws. In its negative or "dormant" form, it prevents states
from adopting protectionist laws that erect barriers to interstate commerce or attempt to
control commerce beyond the state's borders.
Over the last few years, states have adopted various measures trying to address
greenhouse gases, including renewable energy mandates or low carbon fuel standards,
and those state efforts have been challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause. In
2015 that trend continued in Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Lyel, a Tenth
Circuit decision that considered the validity of a Colorado law requiring a certain
percentage of consumer electricity to come from renewable sources. 10 The petitioner
asked the Court of Appeals to apply one particular variant of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, namely the so-called Baldwin "extraterritoriality" doctrine. 11 The Tenth
Circuit referred to this as "the most dormant doctrine in dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause
jurisprudence" and "the least understood." 12 After giving a helpful explanation of the few
cases in the Baldwin line, the court concluded that Colorado's mandate did not "share any
of the three essential characteristics that mark those cases", in that the statute was not "a
price control statute"; it did not "link prices paid in Colorado with those paid out of
state"; and it did not "discriminate against out-of-staters."
13
As to the positive (not dormant) form of the Commerce Clause, we noted in the
2014 Constitutional Law chapter that the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
struck down protections for the prairie dog under the Endangered Species Act because
the creature does not have sufficient connections to interstate commerce. 14 The Tenth
Circuit heard oral argument in that case in September 2015, so look for a decision in the
near future. 15
8789 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
9U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).
111d. at 1172.
12 Id. at 1170, 1172.
13Id. at 1173.
14 People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 57 F.
Supp. 3d 1337, 1346 (D. Utah 2014).15Amy Joi O'Donoghue, 10th Circuit hears prairie dog case brought by Iron County
landowners, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/865637783/10th-Circuit-hears-prairie-dog-
case- brought-b-Iron-County-landowners.html.
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III. PREEMPTION
In September, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on two petitions (now
consolidated) challenging a Fourth Circuit opinion holding that certain state subsidies to
instate power generators were preempted both on the grounds of "field preemption" and
"conflict" (sometimes termed "obstacle") preemption. 16 The two cases are Hughes v.
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, No. 14-614, and CPV Maryland, LLC v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC,
No. 14-623.17 With a decision expected no later than June 2016, these two cases promise
to shed further light on the doctrines of field and conflict preemption in the context of the
world of utility power and on the FERC's decision to delegate rate-making functions to
various regional transmission entities covering interstate markets. The cases also mark
the Court's apparent disregard of the recommendation of the Solicitor General not to take
either case on the grounds that both cases were correctly decided by the Fourth Circuit.
A private plaintiff in a separate case alleging federal preemption of Connecticut's
awards of electric power contracts for alternative sources of energy was not successful,
with the Second Circuit holding that the private party either failed to exhaust
administrative remedies under the statutory scheme or lacked standing to bring such a
claim as to prior contractual awards. In Allco Finance Limited v. Klee,18 the Court of
Appeals held that a losing bidder (plaintiff) failed to establish that setting aside the state's
awards to the two lowest bidders would result in a remedy that would redress plaintiff's
alleged harm (not receiving an award). The court did not explain how plaintiff, which had
one project listed fourth in the original bids, might not benefit if the two lowest bidders
were deemed legally disqualified from the bid process.
A state common law suit founded on negligence, nuisance, and trespass based
upon emissions from a whiskey distiller regulated under the federal Clean Air Act was
held not preempted by the Sixth Circuit. In Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc.,19
the Sixth Circuit focused on the Clean Air Act's "citizen suit savings clause," 20 which
provided that nothing in the Act restricted the right of a person to sue under common law
to seek enforcement of an emissions standard. This clause, the appellate court reasoned,
expressly provided for such common law remedies. The Court of Appeals rejected
defendant's effort to argue that preemption of state common law was merited under the
Supreme Court's decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,2 1 finding that
displacement of federal common law in AEP was quite different from federal preemption
of state common law. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the savings clause in the Clean
Air Act was intended to cover state common law suits and effectively exclude them from
the scope of what might otherwise constitute a preempted state action.
22
16 PPL Energy Plus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
17See Hughes v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.coiilcase-files/cases/nazarian-v-ppl-energyplus-llc/.
18805 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2015).
19805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015).
2042 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2015).
21Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Merrick, 805 F.3d at 693.22The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio came to a similar conclusion
in an unpublished decision holding that local residents' state common law claims against
emissions from two former factories were not preempted under the Clean Air Act. Elmer
v. S.H. Bell Co., No. 4:13-CV-02735, 2015 WL 5102707 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2015).
A suit by truckers asserting that regulation by the California State Air Resources'
Board was preempted under federal transportation laws encountered a fatal obstacle-the
lack of jurisdiction. In California Dump Truck Owners v. Nichols, 23 the Ninth Circuit
held that the trucker's challenge was essentially a challenge to an EPA decision
approving the regulation as part of California's State Implementation Plan (SIP) under
the Clean Air Act. Pursuant to the Act, SIP challenges must be brought in the Court of
Appeals, not the district court.24 Although the Truck Association argued it was only
contesting state enforcement and not the SIP itself, the appellate court did not agree.25
Without jurisdiction, there was no judicial authority to examine the truckers' preemption
claim on its merits.
In evaluating a personal injury claim alleging harmful exposure in connection
with manufacturing parts for a nuclear power plant, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California concluded that state law claims were only preempted to
the degree they actually conflicted with federal radiation standards under the federal
Price-Anderson Act. In Lawson v. General Electric Co., 26 the district court concluded
that the Price-Anderson Act had a "hybrid" preemption provision that allowed
consideration of state law as long as there was not a direct conflict with federal law. The
court concluded that most of plaintiff's common law claims alleging strict liability
conflicted with federal law and were preempted, although it allowed part of plaintiff's
negligence claim to proceed.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon rejected a claim of express and
conflict preemption based on the federal Clean Air Act brought by truckers and the
America Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers who sought to overturn Oregon state
regulation of transportation fuels including methane content. In American Fuel &
27Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O'Keefe , the district court concluded that EPA's
determination not to regulate the methane content of fuels as part of its Reformulated
Gasoline Rule simply did not have preemptive effect precluding state law regulation. The
district court also concluded that plaintiff's claims of conflict preemption were also not
well taken.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii concluded that a county's
ordinance precluding Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) or "genetic engineering"
of foodstuffs was expressly preempted by the federal Plant Protection Act. In Robert Ito
Farm, Inc. v. County of Man, 28 the district court also concluded that Maui's county
ordinance conflicted with federal law and therefore also fell pursuant to the doctrine of
conflict preemption.
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
The widely anticipated takings case of 2015 was Home v. Department o_
Agriculture, which concerned whether USDA's mandate to relinquish a specific amount
of raisin growers' crop as a condition to engaging in commerce was a per se taking. 29 The
Secretary promulgates "marketing orders" to help maintain stable markets for particular
23784 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 403 (2015).
2442 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012).
25Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass'n, 784 F.3d at 508.
26No. 15-cv-02384-TEH, 2015 WL 5591714 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015).
27No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 5665232 (D. Or. Sept. 23, 2015), appeal docketed,
No. 15-35834 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2015).28Nos. 14-00511 SOM/BMK and 14-00582 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480 (D. Haw.
June 30, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-16552 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015).
29135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins requires growers in certain years to
give a percentage of their crop to the federal government, free of charge. Growers
generally ship their raisins to a raisin "handler," who physically separates the raisins
owed to the government ("reserve raisins"), pays the growers for the remainder ("free-
tonnage raisins"), and packs and sells the free-tonnage raisins. The Raisin Committee, a
government entity of growers and others in the raisin business appointed by the
Secretary, acquires title to the reserve raisins and decides how to dispose of them in its
discretion, which can include selling them in non-competitive (e.g., foreign) markets.
Raisin growers retain an interest in any net proceeds from sales that the Committee
makes. The Hornes, both growers and handlers, refused to comply with the marketing
order, and they were charged for the market value of the missing raisins and a $200,000
penalty. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the reserve requirement was not a per se taking,
reasoning that "the Takings Clause affords less protection to personal than to real
property" and the Hornes "are not completely divested of their property rights" because
growers retain an interest in the proceeds from any sale of reserve raisins. 30 Rather, the
reserve requirement was a use restriction, similar to a government condition on a land use
permit.
The Supreme Court reversed. As a threshold matter, the Court disagreed that the
Takings Clause applies only to real property and not to personal property. The Court also
rejected the notion that the government may avoid paying just compensation for a
physical taking of property by reserving to the property owner a contingent interest in a
portion of the value of the property. In other words, once there has been a physical
taking, "'we do not ask ... whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable
use' of the item taken."' 3 1 Finally, the Court held that, at least "in this case," a
governmental mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a "condition" to
engage in commerce effects a per se taking.
32
Other takings cases of note this year included:
* Rancho de Calistoga v. Cit of Calistoga, in which the Ninth Circuit declined to
entertain the creation of an "as-applied private takings claim," dryly observing
that "[e]ach time a court closes one legal avenue to mobile home park owners
seeking to escape rent control regimes, the owners, undaunted, attempt to forge a
new path via another novel legal theory. 33 (Quoting Yogi Berra, the Ninth
Circuit called it "d6jd vu all over again." 34)
* Dimare Fresh, Inc. v. United States, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of tomato producers' regulatory taking claim based on Food and Drug
Administration press releases warning consumers of a possible link between the
producers' tomatoes and a salmonella outbreak, which caused the market for
those tomatoes to crash.35
* Boston Taxi Owners Association, Inc. v. City of Boston, in which the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed a takings claim against the City
of Boston and Massachusetts, among others, for recent amendments to regulations
30 d. at 2425 (citing Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014)).31Id. at 2429 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)).
3 2 Id. at 2430-32.
33800 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2015).
34Id. at 1086.
35No. 2015-5006, 2015 WL 6500337, at *1-3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
that would allow "Transportation Network Companies" such as Uber and Lyft to
operate in most respects as taxicabs without first obtaining a taxi medallion.
36
V. DUE PROCESS
In Grocery Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell, a state motion to dismiss was
denied in an industry's due process challenge to a Vermont statute prohibiting labeling,
advertising, or signage for genetically engineered foods as natural or "any words of
similar import." 37 The court held that the statute's restriction was void for vagueness
because the phrase "any words of similar import" fails to provide fair notice of prohibited
conduct and would thus permit arbitrary enforcement subject to civil penalties. 38 The
appeal is pending in the Second Circuit.
In a closely-watched challenge to a county ban on fossil-fuel extraction by
corporations, Swepi, LP v. Mora CountL, the court rejected a substantive due process
challenge (although the ban was invalidated on preemption and Supremacy Clause
grounds). 39 In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court determined
that the county could not be said to lack a rational basis for targeting corporations which,
for example, could evade responsibility by undercapitalizing themselves. The court also
rejected the argument that property interests and rights are so fundamental as to require
strict scrutiny. Courts similarly declined to find due process violations because of a lack
of a legitimate property interest, including in loan programs for green car
manufacturing.
4 0
Interestingly, litigants brought challenges in environmental enforcement actions
alleging that opposing counsel or an agency official should have been disqualified on due
process grounds, although these challenges were unsuccessful in the end. 41 Litigants
attempting to challenge the robustness of due process were similarly unsuccessful.
42
3684 F. Supp. 3d 72, 75 (D. Mass. 2015).
37102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 596 (D. Vt. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d Cir. May 6,
2015).381d. at 642-45. But see Little v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-00060, 2015
WL 5730424, at *5 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2015) (state statute not void for vagueness where
it allowed a natural gas company to enter a property for pipeline surveying purposes even
if without owner consent where the statute so allows); Black v. Pritzker, No. 14-782
(CKK), 2015 WL 4747409, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2015) (fair notice satisfied where
regulation banned fish aggregating devices and use of lights aggregated fish).
3981 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1173-78 (D.N.M. 2015).
4 0See also XP Vehicles. Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, No. 13-cv-0037 (KBJ), 2015 WL
4249167 (D.D.C. July 14, 2015) (no cognizable property interest where agency discretion
prevents loan from becoming a government entitlement); McClung v. Paul 788 F.3d 822,
829-30 (8th Cir. 2015) (no claim of entitlement in use permit); Klemic v. Dominion
Transmission, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00041, 2015 WL 5772220, at *20 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30,
2015) (no property right to exclude natural gas company from entering property for
pipeline survey); Quinn v. Bd. of Cnt.ueen Anne s Cnty, No. GLR-14-
3529, 2015 WL 4910749, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2015) (no claim of entitlement to a
sewer connector from government).
41See, e.g., Mississippi Comm'n on Envtl. Ouality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 183-84 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (no due process violation where EPA administrator who designated non-
attainment area under the Clean Air Act declined to disqualify himself where clear and
convincing showing was lacking that, despite his history of working with environmental
advocates, he had not unalterably closed his mind in decision-making process); United
States v. Farrell, No. 2:14-cr-00264, 2015 WL 3891640, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 24,
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT
This review focuses on First Amendment cases that directly affect environmental,
energy, or natural resources concerns. "Free speech" cases in this area are rare. Most such
cases actually arise under federal statutes protecting religious freedom-the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 43 or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA)44 -rather than the Constitution itself. However, this year we
address a landmark Supreme Court case that has the potential to dramatically affect a host
of issues pertaining to the environment, energy, and natural resources, as well as many
other aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence. Because of the importance of this
singular case, discussion of other reported cases will necessarily be shorter in this review.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona45 merits a great deal of attention. The case flew
into Washington under everyone's radar, characterized as a minor dispute involving a
church's challenge to a local sign code. The itinerant church used temporary signs to
advise parishioners about the location of services. Those signs were deemed illegal under
the sign code, although messages of similar size were allowed if they fell under the
category of "political signs" or "temporary directional signs." Following oral argument,
commentators believed that the case would be decided on the basis of the general
meanness and stupidity of the ordinance with no major change in doctrine. Instead, the
Supreme Court used the opportunity to redefine what it means by a "content-based" law.
This has major implications because content-based laws are automatically subject to strict
scrutiny, and such strict review generally spells doom for a law.
The Supreme Court soundly rejected what it perceived as a tendency of the lower
courts to uphold laws that were justified by a content-neutral purpose or that regulated
speech at the level of broad categories as opposed to particular messages or speakers.
Thus, laws that had the actual effect of regulating based on the message or speaker were
upheld as long as the law did not suggest an actual intent to censor that speech. As the
Supreme Court made clear, such justifications are no longer sufficient: "[A]n innocuous
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content
neutral."46
A plurality of the Court instead adopted a rather strict and bright-line test for
determining whether a law is content based; if the law defines the subject of its regulation
in terms of the message, it is content based. Given the importance of this concept, a
lengthy quote from the decision is warranted:
Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase "content based"
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face"
draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial
2015) (no due process violation where government counsel could be putative plaintiffs in
a class action case involving the same chemical spill at issue in the prosecution).42 Mversville Citizens for a Rural Cmty, Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1327 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (no due process violation where no prejudice resulted from belated disclosure of
information for commenting on environmental review).
4342 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
4442 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
45135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
46Id. at 2228.
distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by
particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated
speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on
the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict
scrutiny.
Our precedents have also recognized a separate and additional
category of laws that, though facially content neutral, will be considered
content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be "'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,"' or that were
adopted by the government "because of disagreement with the message
[the speech] conveys." Those laws, like those that are content based on
their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.
47
Reed likely renders most sign ordinances in the country unconstitutional. It has already
had a profound impact on decisions involving solicitation or panhandling laws. It is also
likely to overhaul the law relative to "free speech zones," parades, demonstrations and
many other real-world applications of First Amendment law. Citation to Reed will be de
rigueur in any case where the content of speech is at issue or a facial attack is brought
under the First Amendment.
Other First Amendment cases this year include:
* Animal Legal DeLense Fund v. Otter, a significant case involving an "Ag-Gag
law" which drew a fair amount of media attention. 4 8 Animal rights activists
distributed video of dairymen doing unpleasant things to our bovine friends,
which prompted the state legislature to criminalize interference with agricultural
production facilities. The activists brought First Amendment and Equal Protection
claims against the law, which went down in flames as both a content-based and
viewpoint-based restriction on speech.
* Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village ofPomona, an
exceptionally lengthy opinion which can be recommended only because it
includes an uncommon sanction for failure to preserve posts on social media and
because of its "kitchen sink" approach to litigation.49 This is a conventional
RLUIPA case complaining about local zoning and environmental regulations that
effectively prevented the construction of a religious school. The statutory case
was dressed up with First Amendment claims based on free exercise, free speech,
and free association. The laws were found to be content-neutral for purposes of all
of the First Amendment claims. The Court found that construction of a college
would promote free speech but was not itself a form of communication. Other
claims survived for trial.
* Bensalem Maslid, Inc. v. Bensalem TownshiI2, Penns3ivania, addressing the same
sort of combined RLUIPA/Free Exercise claims.50 These religion cases are
relatively common and no new ground was plowed here. One thing that does
separate these cases from other First Amendment cases is the frequency with
which summary judgment motions are denied. The expense of a trial places a
burden on government not often encountered in other First Amendment cases.
4 7Id. at 2227 (internal citations omitted).
4 8No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015).
49No. 07-CV-6304 (KMK), 2015 WL 5729783, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015).
5 0No. 14-6955, 2015 WL 5611546 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015).
CTIA-The Wireless Association v. CiLy of Berkeley, California, a fun case
involving energy-the electromagnetic kind that cellphones emit. 5 1 Berkeley
required cell phone manufacturers and retailers to include a statement to the effect
that cell phones emit radiation, which might be of concern. The First Amendment
claim based on undue burden and compelled speech failed, although a minor
preemption argument was partly sustained.
VII. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity from suit in federal courts, stating
that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."' 52
In Hays v. LaForge, 53 the federal district court discussed three possible
exceptions to the suit immunity of the Eleventh Amendment: (1) valid abrogation by
Congress pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) waiver or consent to
suit by the state; and (3) applicability of the Ex parte Young doctrine. In Hays, the
plaintiff, a professor at a state university, filed a section 1983 action against the university
president in both his official capacity and individual capacity, alleging a free speech
retaliation claim. The Hays court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine applied but
granted the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion because the plaintiff's actions and speech
were part of his official duties and so were not protected by the First Amendment.
In Beaulieu v. State oL Vermont, 54 the Second Circuit considered how a state
defendant's removal of a case to federal court affected Eleventh Amendment immunity
and general state sovereign immunity. More than 700 current and former employees of
the State of Vermont alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in regard
to overtime pay by the State. The plaintiffs sued the State, its Agency of Administration,
and its Secretary of Administration in his official capacity in state court, and the
defendants removed the case to federal court. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the suit. In so ruling, the appellate court decided to join the majority
of circuit courts by holding "that, while [d]efendants may, by removing the action, have
waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal forum, Defendants
have not expressly waived Vermont's general sovereign immunity from private FLSA
suit, and their litigation conduct does not constitute such a waiver."
55
In Haven v. The Board of 7rustees oj Three Rivers Regional Library System, 56 the
Eleventh Circuit dealt with an age employment-discrimination lawsuit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) against the Three Rivers Regional Library
System (Library) and its Director. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia granted the Library's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs
ADEA suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Library was entitled to
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and that it was "uncontestedly an arm of the
51No. C-15-2529 EMC, 2015 WL 5569072, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015).52U.S. CONST., amend. XI.53No. 4:14-cv-00148-GHD-JMV, 2015 WL 4087070 (N.D. Miss. July 6, 2015).
54807 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2015).
55Id. at 481.
56No. 15-11064, 2015 WL 5040174 (1lth Cir., Aug. 27, 2015).
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state" even though the Library had not raised the immunity issue. 57 The lower court also
ruled that the Exparte Young exception did not apply.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity de
novo as well as the issue of whether the Library was an "arm of the state" entitled to
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In its review, the court stated that "[a]lthough
Congress has the power, within limitations, to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Supreme Court has held that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, did not
validly abrogate the states' immunity."' 5 8 The appellate court ultimately vacated the
dismissal of the ADEA claim and remanded the issue of whether the Library was entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state under the four-prong test
established in Manders v. Lee.
59
Concerning the sovereign immunity of a state, on June 30, 2015, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear two of the three questions presented in Franchise Tax Board o_
Califbrnia (CFIB) v. Hyatt. Both questions involved a state's sovereign immunity in
another state's courts: (1) "[w]hether Nevada may refuse to extend to sister States haled
into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada enjoys in those courts"; and (2)
"[w]hether Nevada v. Hall... which permits a sovereign State to be haled into the courts
of another State without its consent, should be overruled., 61 Forty-five states supported
California's position of overruling Nevada v. Hall.
62
In the CFTB case, respondent Gilbert Hyatt won a multi-million dollar judgment
against the California Franchise Tax Board in a Nevada state court. 63 Hyatt alleged that
CFTB auditors committed several intentional torts against him in Nevada as part of
CFTB's decades-old battle over his non-payment of California income taxes. During oral
argument held on December 7, 2015, Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor seemed
sympathetic to upholding Nevada v. Hall.64 Justice Breyer also seemed sympathetic to
that position, but he expressed concern that Nevada had not extended its own $50,000
sovereign immunity limitation on damages to California. 65 Justices Alito and Scalia
5 7Id. at *2 (quoting Haven v. Bd. Of Trs. Of Three Rivers Reg'l Library Sys., 69 F. Supp.
3d 1359, 1365-66 (S.D. Ga. 2014).58Id. at *3.
591d. at *4-5. In determining whether an entity is an "arm of the State", the Eleventh
Circuit implements a four-part test: "(1) how state law defines the entiry; (2) what degree
of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and
(4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity." Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304,
1309 (1 lth Cir. 2003).
60335 P.3d 125 (Nev. 2014), cert. granted in part, 135 S. Ct. 2940 (2015).61Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, No. 14-1175
(U.S. petition for cert. filed Mar. 23, 2015). See also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/franchise-tax-
board-of-california-v-hyatt/; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
62See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., No. 14-1175 (U.S.
argued Dec. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript]; Brief for S.C. State Ports Authority as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., No. 14-1175 (U.S.
filed Sept. 10, 2015); Brief for W. Va., et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. (U.S. filed Sept. 10, 2015).63Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 335 P.3d at 125.
64Transcript, supra note 62, at 4-7, 9-13, 15-17, 23-26, 57; Lyle Denniston, Argument
Analysis: Seeking Two-Century-Old Guidance, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 7, 2015, 3:33 PM)
[hereinafter Argument Analysis], http ://www. scotusblog.com2015/12/arguinent-analysis-
seeking-two-century-old-guidance/.65Transcript, supra note 62, at 17-19, 28-29, 40-44; Argument Analysis, supra note 64.
338
seemed sympathetic to California's position, although Justice Scalia did seem concerned
that under California's position, a foreign country, but not a sister state, could be sued in
a state court.66 Justice Kennedy asked whether there was anything in "our constitutional
tradition that say[s] States can protect each other by retaliating against each other?" 67
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas did not ask any questions. A decision could be
issued as early as March 2016.
VIII. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in Sanders-Reed v. Martinez68 held that the
common law public trust doctrine did not authorize the judicial branch to unilaterally
impose greenhouse gas emissions. The court held that the New Mexico Constitution
delegated environmental authority, including air regulation, to the New Mexico
Legislature. 69 The court concluded that the constitutional provision superseded common
law. Second, the Legislature implemented the constitutional provision by creating an
Environmental Improvement Board (EIB), which provided an adequate remedy. Finally,
the relief requested violated separation of powers.
. -o 70
The Georgia Supreme Court in Elbert Countb v. Sweet CiL Land i applied a
balancing test on a dormant commerce clause challenge to a local solid waste ordinance.
The ordinance was facially neutral. The court refused to apply the less deferential
71standard applicable to local law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce.
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Hosemann v. Harris72 ruled on an issue that is
common to all states. Where is the location of the boundary between private uplands and
submerged sovereign lands held in public trust by the state? 73 The Hosemann case
followed up on a 1988 decision of a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,74 which held that each state with tidelands took public trust
title at statehood to all lands underlying tidally influenced waters. The Hosemann court
noted that sandy beaches on the Gulf of Mexico ordinarily are bounded at the mean high
water line. Nevertheless, the State alleged the beach at issue was filled in tidelands. The
court reversed partial summary judgment for the private littoral owner and remanded for
factual determination of the sovereign boundary.
75
66Transcript, supra note 62, at 22, 33-37, 49-50, see also David G. Savage, In California
Tax Dispute, Supreme Court Ponders When One State Can be Sued in Another's Courts,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.latimes.cornnation/la-na-supreme-
court-california-taxpayer-20151207-storvohtml, ("The justices sounded closely split in the
case of California Franchise Tax Board vs. Hyatt, with a majority appearing to lean in
favor of California.").67Transcript, supra note 62, at 5; Argument Analysis, supra note 64.
68350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).691d. at 1225-27; see also N.M. Const., art. 20, § 21.
70297 Ga. 429, 774 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. 2015).
711d. at 434-35 (citing United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338, 346 (2007)).
72163 So. 3d 263 (Miss. 2015).
73See, e.g., Sidney F. Ansbacher, Stop the Beach Renourishment: A Case of MacGuffins
and Legal Fiction, 35 NOVA L. REV. 587 (2011).
74484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988).
75Hosemann, 163 So.3d at 270, 274.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Louisville Gas and Electric Company v.
KentucLk Waterways Alliance, distinguished between state constitutional venue and
jurisdiction. The Kentucky Constitution creates one unitary circuit court,77 and a statute
establishes venue for administrative appeals in one circuit court. On an issue that
addressed the separation of powers (even though it was not labeled as such) the majority
held the State Energy and Environment Cabinet failed to conduct a statutorily required
"case by case best professional judgment" of the subject effluent treatment technology.
The dissent contended it is not the job of the judiciary to set technology-based effluent
limitations.79
7 6No. 2013-CA-001695-MR, No. 2013-CA-00172-MR, 2015 WL 3427746 (Ky. Ct. App.
May 29, 2015).
77 Ky. CONST. § 109.
7 8Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.10-470, 452.105 (West 2015).
79Louisville Gas and Elec. Co., 2015 WL 3427746, at *7.
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